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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS-ACTs OF BANKRUPTCY.-The

debtor

had filed its petition as a Michigan corporation praying for dissolution under the
local statutes [MICH. CorAp. LAWS (1929) § 15310]. The debtor corporation was

in fact insolvent. The Michigan court entered its decree dissolving the corporation and appointed a receiver to carry out the liquidation of the company's
affairs. Within four months thereafter a creditor petitioned the bankruptcy court
to have the corporation adjudicated a bankrupt, alleging as an act of bankruptcy
the debtor's petitioning voluntarily for dissolution when it was insolvent. The
bankruptcy court denied a motion by the equity receiver to dismiss the petition.
On appeal, held, order affirmed; the operation of the bankruptcy laws cannot be
defeated by voluntary dissolution under state statutes. Austin v. Thomas, 78 F.
(2d) 602 (C.C.A. 6th, 1935).
Although a corporation has ceased to exist in the eyes of its own domestic
courts it is not beyond the reach of the bankruptcy court. Hammond v. Lyon
Really Co., 59 F. (2d) 592 (C.C.A. 4th, 1932) ; see also in re Watts and Sachs,
190 U.S. 1, 23 Sup Ct. 718, 47 L.ed. 933 (1902). The Federal Constitution [Art.
1, § 8 (4)] gives Congress exclusive power to establish uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcy, and any state law may be a bankruptcy law in substance
and in fact which provides for the administration and distribution of the estates
of insolvents. Barks v. Kleyne, 15 F. (2d) 153 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926). State insolvency laws are suspended to the extent that they conflict with the Bankruptcy
Act. Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 38 Sup. Ct. 215, 62 L.ed. 507 (1917). The
court, in the principal case, was not required to fix the precise time when the
act of bankruptcy was committed. The voluntary petition for dissolution was
filed, the decree for dissolution was entered, and the receiver appointed, all within
four months before the filing of the involuntary petition in bankruptcy. The
appointment of a receiver to liquidate the affairs of a corporation dissolved on a
voluntary petition to the Michigan equity court under the local statutes is not an
act of bankruptcy if the corporation is not in fact insolvent. Vassar Foundry
Corp'n. v. Whiling Corp'n., 2 F. (2d) 240 (C.C.A. 6th, 1925). If the corporation
is not in fact insolvent the statutory scheme under which the equity court through
its receiver is supervising the liquidation of the dissolved corporation's affairs is
not an "insolvency law" in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. Vassar Foundry

Corp'n v. Whiting Corp'n., supra. It is submitted that a voluntary dissolution by
a special majority vote of the stockholders under the Wisconsin statutes [Wis.
(1933) c. 181] would not by itself be an act of bankruptcy. Some conduct
thereafter on the part of the statutory trustees, the old corporation directors, or
previous conduct on the part of the directors, as such, just before dissolution,
STAT.

together with the fact of insolvency as defined in the Bankruptcy Act [see § 1
(15), 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. 1 (15) (1926)] would have to be shown
to justify the bankruptcy court's adjudicating the dissolved corporate debtor a
bankrupt and supervising the liquidation of the estate. The opinion in the principal case, however, indicates quite definitely that if the requisite facts are present

the estate of such a dissolved corporation-debtor would not be outside the scope
of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.
CLYDE F. BALEY.
BILLS

AND

NOTES--STATUTE

OF

LIMITATIoNS-AccoMODATION

MAKER.-

A claim was filed against the estate of the decedent on a promissory note executed by the decedent along with five other joint makers. The decedent had
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• signed as an accommodation party. The note was executed on January 13, 1919,
and was payable one year from that date. Interest had been paid on the note
until 1932 by the principal debtors, the other co-makers. The claim against the
estate was dismissed by the county court because it was barred by the
statute of limitations. Held, on appeal, order affirmed; the accommodation maker
by "waiving notice" of renewals had not consented to payments to be made on
his behalf. In re Schinidt's Estate, (Wis. 1935) 261 N.W. 240.
Under the common law rule, payments by one co-maker tolled the statute
of limitations as to both. Cox v. Bailey, 9 Ga. 467, 54 Am. Dec. 358 (1851) ; Burgoon v. Bixler, 55 Md. 384, 39 Am. Rep. 417 (1881). An accommodation indorser is
not a co-obligor with the maker of a promissory note. The indorser's responsibility on a negotiable note must be fixed by presentment for payment and the
giving of notice of dishonor. Wis. STAT. (1933) §§ 116.75, 117.07. Thereafter any
conduct by the principal debtor, in the way of the payment of interest or the
acknowledging of the indebtedness, cannot toll the statute with respect to the
accommodation party without the latter's express authority. Smith v. Do'wden,
92 N.J.L. 317, 105 Atl. 720 (1919) ; and cf. Bishop v. Genz, 212 Wis. 30, 248 N.W.
771 (1933) where the accommodation party was not technically an indorser but
a "guarantor." Nor should any conduct by the accommodation indorser affect
the position of the principal debtor-maker with respect to the tolling of the
statute. Cf. White v. Pittsburgh Vein Coal Co., 266 Pa. 116, 109 Atl. 873 (1920).
The effect of payment by one co-obligor, principal debtor or accommodation
party, upon the tolling of the statute as to all is frequently covered by express
statutory provisions. See Ford v. Schall, 110 Or. 21, 221 Pac. 1052, 222 Pac. 1094
(1924). The Wisconsin statute provides that payment of interest or payment of a
part of the indebtedness by one will not affect the position of the other joint
debtor. Wis. STAT. (1933) § 330.47. But the other joint debtor can in fact consent to such payment of interest and such consent will then toll the statute with
respect to both parties. Gillitzer v. Ducho'rne,203 Wis. 269, 234 N.W. 503 (1931).
This section is not limited by express terms to cases involving principal debtors
and accommodation parties, nor to cases involving obligations evidenced by
negotiable paper. Where the joint co-makers of negotiable paper purport to agree
by provisions written onto the face of the note to all extensions and partial
payments before and after maturity without prejudice to the holder, the court
has held that such is, in effect, a power of attorney by each co-maker to the
others authorizing partial payments on behalf of all. Kline v. Fritsch, 213 Wis.
51, 250 N.W. 837 (1933). In the principal case there was literally a waiver of
notice as to extensions on the note. And the court felt that this meant the
execution by the principal debtor of a new note and the taking of that note by
the holder. The court refused to construe the literal provision with respect to
extensions as amounting to consent to the payments which the other co-debtors
had made.
WILUAM J. Nuss.
CHATTEL

MORTGAGES-FoRECLOSURES-CONSTITUTIONALITy

OF

PENALTIES

IN

FoREcLosuRE STATUTES.-The plaintiff brought this action to foreclose a real
estate mortgage which was executed together with two chattel mortgages on live
stock and farm machinery as security for a $5,500 promissory note. The mortgagors set up as a defense the seizure without their consent of the property
covered by the chattel mortgages and the sale thereof in contravention of Sections 241.13 and 241.15 [Wis. STAT. (1933)] which provide that for any violation
of any provision thereof the owner of the equity may recover damages sus-

